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Abstract: Islamic politics has become an integral part of 
Indonesia’s political history. This qualitative study investigates 
Prosperous Justice Party/Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and 
Hizb at-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) as two new Islamic movements, 
which are involved much in current political constellation in 
Indonesia. The study reveals that the stream of thought and 
strategy of PKS and HTI concerning on politics, state, and 
sharia differ. PKS tends to be accommodationist revivalists, 
whereas HTI is likely to be confrontationists revivalists. The 
accommodationists believe that any values or doctrines, which 
exist within society should not be rejected as long as it is not at 
odds with Islamic teachings. While Confrontationist revivalists 
argue that any system not derived from Islam assumed as the 
cause of all forms of crisis, especially the moral and political 
turmoil, and causes Muslims away from the implementation of 
Islamic teachings. With regard to the relation between Islam 
and state, PKS activists argue that Islam does not standardize 
the concept of the state, but it only gives basic principles. 
Nevertheless, Islam and politics cannot be separated because 
Islam covers political affairs and the statehood 
accommodationist and confrontational revivalist Muslim. 
Keywords: Islamic Revivalist, Prosperous Justice Party, New 
Movement.  
 
Introduction 
In political life, Islam offers the widest horizon of thought in 
various formulations of ideas on social and legal norms, new virtues 
and aspirations. Islam provides the most effective symbols for political 
mobilization, whether to arouse people to defend a regime or to fight a 
regime that is considered to lack legitimacy.  
In Indonesia, Islamic politic has become part of the national 
political constellation. One of the issues that have appeared either as 
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discourse or as an Islamic movement is the compatibility between the 
state and Islam. Regarding to this, there are two type of Islamic groups. 
First group is the form of national political system such as the Party of 
Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations/Majelis Shura Muslimin 
Indonesia (Masyumi) party during old order era1 and the Justice Party 
Prosperous/Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) during the reform era. The 
second group is non-political system such as Darul Islam (DI) and 
Hizbut Tahrir (HT).  
During old order, the Masyumi failed to restore the Jakarta Charter 
as the state constitution. Further, the Islamic political activists hope 
that new order regime could accommodate the Muslims aspirations to 
apply Islamic sharia as a whole in laws and constitution. In addition, 
they expected three points from the new order regime. First, the 
release of their leaders from detention. Second, the rehabilitation of 
the Masyumi party that Sukarno disbanded. Third, re-entering the 
seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the state constitution to 
implement sharia Islam2.  
However, those expectations could not be obtained because the 
leaders of the new order, who mostly were the military, considered that 
the rehabilitation of the Masyumi and its leaders and the effort to 
establish an Islamic state would disturb the integrity of the country. 
Although the Masyumi actually opposed the Islamic revolution, some 
leaders of Masyumi involved in the Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia/Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI), 
a subversive government set up in Sumatra to oppose the central 
government of Indonesia in 1958. It was one of the reasons, why the 
military leaders refused to rehabilitate the Masyumi and release its 
leaders. Meanwhile, concerning re-entering the seven words of the 
Jakarta Charter into the state constitution raised highly controversial 
issues and resulted never-ending fierce debate in People’s Consultative 
Assembly/Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) in 1996.  
Furthermore, the government applied the carrot and stick 
approach to the Muslim demands. The government actively pursued 
various political initiatives that considered could attack the national 
                                                                
1 Maswadi Rauf, Konsensus Politik Sebuah Penjajagan Teoritis (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal 
Pendidikan Tinggi, Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2000), p. 126. 
2 C.W. Watson, “Muslims and the State in Indonesia”, Hussin Mutalib and Taj ul-Islam 
Hashmi (eds), Islam, Muslims and the Modern State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 
p. 174.  
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stability, while at the same time encourage the development in the field 
of religious ritual education and practice. This condition was a portrait 
of the relationship between the Muslims and the state in Indonesia 
since the mid-1960s.  
Dealing with this situation, the Islamic political activists who 
demanded the enforcement of sharia Islam responded through three 
actions. First, they increased the political demands (application of 
Islamic values) within the state. Second, they increased self-awareness 
of the Muslim community (concerning the importance of an Islamic 
state). Third, they embrace extra parliamentary powers to protest and 
campaign the enforcement of Islamic values within the state3.  
The new order government responded the actions by using 
secularization technique once practiced by Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch 
colonial agent, it was separation between religion and politics which 
basically against Islamic teachings as Islam covers various aspects of 
human life, from political to government affairs. The secularization 
aimed to lame the Muslim leadership and exacerbated it and to keep 
the Muslim commitment from the political world.  
It can be seen from the separation of Pancasila, foundational 
philosophical theory of the Indonesian state, which was taught in the 
course Pancasila Moral Education/Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (PMP), 
and the Guidance of Practice and the Pancasila/Pedoman Penghayatan 
dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4) with the religious education. Another 
evidence was the motto ‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’ the official national 
motto of Indonesia which means unity in diversity, has been 
interpreted excessively through generalizing that all religions is the 
same, with the reason to keep the unity of the nation.  
Additionally, although the first precepts of Pancasila, and the 
Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution have guaranteed the freedom of 
religion, but in practice not all religious teachings, especially the Islamic 
teachings could be exercised by the adherents. The policy to establish 
Pancasila as the Single Principle (Asas Tunggal) for all civil society 
organizations, political parties, and the government often presented a 
repressive attitude towards Islamic activists when conveying their 
aspirations. For instance, the Muslim adherents were only allowed to 
practice their religious teachings were related to their personal affairs 
such as marriage, inheritance and guardianship.  
                                                                
3 Ibid. 
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Meantime, the other efforts to implement the Islamic sharia in the 
state in Indonesia were conducted by the Muslims through various 
ways, i.e some participated in implementing the agreed development 
agenda through government channels, and some did the movement 
with a number of actions and protests outside the prevailing 
government system. The condition continued until the reforms era in 
1998. The relationship between the government (state) and the diverse 
elements of Islamic society at the time was different depend on the 
issue that developed by the Islamic community. When the ideas 
referred to the Islamic ideology as the ideology of the country, the 
government provided an antagonistic attitude. On the contrary, when 
the ideas supported the existing systems, the government was 
accommodative.4  
The other efforts to apply Islamic sharia in the government 
continued rolling through various Islamic movements such as in the 
form of a political party, and mass movement. Some Islamic political 
parties participated in the General Election in 1999. The parties were 
the United Development Party/Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), 
Justice Party/Partai Keadilan (PK) which later renamed as the 
Prosperous Justice Party/Partai Keadilan Sosial (PKS), the National 
Awakening Party/Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and the Crescent 
Star Party/Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB). This PBB is actually often 
identified by New Masyumi Party. Out of those parties, PBB and PKS 
blatantly support the application of Islamic sharia. Meanwhile, mass 
Islamic organizations were the Islamic Defenders Front/Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI), the Lasykar Jihad, the Mujahidin Council of 
Indonesia/Majelis Muslim Indonesia (MMI), and Liberation Party/Hizb 
at-Tahrir (HT).  
However, the Islamic movement was generally dissatisfied with the 
ongoing conditions. They wanted to make radical changes in the 
system of government and society.5 According to Nazaruddin 
Sjamsuddin, the demands of a number of activists who voiced (sharia) 
Islam actually concerning to the upholding of justice.6 Some 
organization that were not in the form of a political party actively 
voiced. In August 2000, they proposed the Annual Session/Sesi 
                                                                
4 Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1998). 
5 Arief B. Iskandar, “Dilema Penerapan Syari’at Islam di Negara Sekuler”, al-Wa’ie, No. 
11 (2001). 
6 Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, Dinamika Sistem Politik Indonesia (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1993). 
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Tahunan (ST) of the People’s Consultative Assembly/Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) to include the Jakarta Charter/Piagam 
Jakarta (PJ), “the state is based on the One Supreme Godship with the 
obligation to observe the Islamic sharia for its adherents”, into the 
Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. 
These attempts again failed in the trial. The secular parties, and 
several Islamic based parties opposed them, as well as and the two 
largest Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah disagreed with 
the Islamic sharia within the state, the Islamic sharia according to them 
supposed to be applied by the society.7 As a result, the session of the 
Constituent Assembly in 1955, ultimately failed to include the PJ in the 
1945 Constitution. 
The political reforms took place in Indonesia began after the fall of 
Soeharto, the president of the New Order. In this era, the 
democratization faucet and change tunnel were opened toward the 
nation and state matters. Reform was the momentum of change for 
the life of the nation and the state, which included the re-arrangement 
and recover of the constitution and various aspects related to the 
economics, politics, and culture considered mistaken in the past. 
The reforms that was gone through in Indonesia led to the 
transition conditions, in terms of both leadership and the government 
system. This transition was an appropriate momentum to provide 
fundamental input for the establishment of an ideal system of 
government to support political, economic, and social systems.8 It is at 
this moment that many Muslims hope to be able to transform Islamic 
values into the system of government and society 
In the reform era, the establishment of an Islamic state was no 
longer the focus of the conversation. It had shifted to the application 
of Islamic law within the nation and the state. The implementation of 
Islamic sharia later become the discourse of Indonesian society 
particularly among the intellectuals. The discussion was also limited 
around the law of inheritance, marriage, divorce, and reconciliation. 
The discourse of Islamic law enforcement/Syariat Islam (SI) reappeared 
in different regions such as the province of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam 
(NAD) that had long demanded its enforcement, some areas in West 
                                                                
7 Deliar Noer, Islam & Politik (Jakarta: Yayasan Risalah, 2003). 
8 Juan J. Linz, Menjauhi Demokrasi Kaum Penjahat (Bandung: Mizan, 2001). 
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Java province included Banten, Cianjur, Garut, Tasikmalaya and 
others.  
After a long struggle, the Local Regulation/Peraturan Daerah 
(Perda) of Aceh Number 5 year 2000 on the Implementation of 
Islamic sharia was issued, it also was strengthened by the Law No. 18 
of 2001 stipulated the name of Aceh Province as Nangroe Aceh 
Darussalam (NAD) province and having special autonomy status. 
Followed by Presidential Decree/Keputusan Presiden (Keppres) 
number 11 year 2003 regarding the Sharia Court in Aceh. Other 
regions were still struggling to get the provisions to implement the SI, 
which is further defined as Perda.9  
To obtain clear description about the Islamic movement in 
Indonesia done by both the Islamic politic and non-Islamic politic 
party, it is interested to investigate more deeply the Islamic movement 
in the Islamic political constellation in Indonesia. There are two moves 
that interesting to be investigated specifically in terms of the thinking 
of the state and the movement of realizing the thinking, namely the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Hizb at-Tahrir (HT) or the 
Liberation Party. Both are political Islam organizations that voice 
Islam in the practice of society and state, with a network of da‘wa and 
different methods.  
Both are differ in the state ideas and methods of implementation. 
PKS does not mention the struggle to establish an Islamic state, while 
HT championed it. In addition, the two movements are getting a place 
in various circles in Indonesia, especially among the intellectual and 
economic middle. For example, the PK which in the 1999 Election 
received only 1.4 million votes (1.7% of voters) with 7 seats in the 
DPR, jumped to 8.3 million votes in the 2004 elections (7.34% of 
voters) with 45 seats in the DPR . While HT at the beginning of the 
reform of 1998 only got support among students at several universities 
on the island of Java, but now it has recruited various circles in the 
country.  
 
Streams of Islamic Thought in Indonesia 
The views on the relationship of religion and state in Islam are 
varied. The differences led to a political orientation that emphasizes 
the implementation of Islamic sharia as the foundation of government 
                                                                
9 See Kamaruzzaman Bustaman-Ahmad, “The Aplication of Islamic Law in Indonesia: 
The Case Study in Aceh”, Journal of Indonesian Islam 1, 1 (2007): pp. 135-180. 
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and state. Some argue that Islam and the state are a coherent of dien 
(religion), dunya (world), and daulah (state). Some said that although 
Islam is not only about the issue of ritual, but Islam also does not put a 
standard pattern on the theory of the country, while the other 
developed the idea that Islam is separate from state affairs. Such a 
division can be derived from the thought of Munawir Sadzali10 as 
shown in table 1.  
Table 1. The Streams of Islamic Thought 
Streams  Thought 
Fundamentalist Islam concerns all aspects of life including political 
and state issues 
Modernist Islam provides principles in the field of life, but does 
not cover the subject of detail in terms of government 
or state 
Secularist Islam regulate ritual matters and do not regulate 
political and state affairs 
Those with an Islamic political orientation, positioned by Bachtiar 
Effendy on two different spectra. First, the group who view that Islam 
should be the basis of the state; that sharia should be accepted as the 
state constitution; that political sovereignty is in the hands of God; that 
the idea of a nation state contradicts the concept of the ummah (Islamic 
community) which has no political or regional boundaries; and that the 
application of the concept of shu>ra is different from the idea of 
democracy. Second, the group who state that Islam does not put a 
standard pattern on the state theory (political system) that must be run 
by the ummah.11  
Table 2. Political Islam 
Spectrum Political Thought 
Formalist Islam has the concept of the state, for that Islam should 
be the basis of the state 
Substantialist Islam do not define the concept of the state by default but 
only provide the main principles of political and state 
issues, for which the principles must be implemented 
 
                                                                
10 Munawir Sadzali, Islam dan Tata Negara; Ajaran, Sejarah, dan Pemikiran (Jakarta: UI 
Press, 1993). 
11 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001). 
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The idea of the Islamic state in the 20th century started from a 
drastically world changed condition, mainly due to the Western 
invasion that necessitated the rise of Muslims. According to Nikki R. 
Keddie “the rise of modern Islam has actually been born since the 19th 
century, through a campaign echoed by the Young Ottomans 
concerning the importance of reformist Pan-Islamists. Such the idea 
was born of a prominent reformer Jamaluddin Al-Afghani who 
received Shiite education in Iran”.12 The ideas developed by Afghani 
were inseparable from his life experience at the time, so that his 
movements essentially advocated against Islam from the western 
invasion. 13  
The ideas according to Hamid Enayat continued by his students 
namely Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Ridha 
(1865-1935). Both are Egyptians and later known to develop the 
theories of the state according to Islam. Abduh combined humanism 
and modern rationalism with the early life of Islam (salafiah), while 
Rida increasingly developed the state theories that become the doctrine 
for the fundamentalists in the future. Furthermore, Rasyid Rida’s 
thoughts are believed to have a major influence on the formation of 
the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood activists (founded by Hasan Al-
Banna, 1928) in Egypt and other activists in the Sunni Muslim world.14 
The spirit of Islamic renewal then spreaded to all other Islamic 
movements in the world. In 1947, Abul A‘la Al-Maududi founded 
Jami‘ati Islami in India (1947), then developed in Pakistan. In 1953, 
Hizb at-Tahrir was established in Palestine. The similar movement were 
Syarikat Islam (1905), Muhammadiyah (1912), Islamic Unity (1922) and 
Nahdlatul Ulama (1926) in Indonesia which have been the driving 
force of independence in 1945. The other later movements that 
criticized the secular government, and its various injustices, and 
demanded the enactment of Islamic sharia, which Oliver Roy referred 
to as fundamentalist Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb at-
Tahrir, Jama‘ati Islami, and Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).15 
                                                                
12 Nikki R. Keddie, “Sayyid Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani’,” Ali Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers of 
Islamic Revival (London, UK: Zed Book Ltd., 1994), pp. 11-24. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (London: Macmillan Press, 1982). 
15 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994). 
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In Indonesia ideological movements reappeared at the momentum 
of reform and never disappeared in the political arena. The rising of 
Islamic movement after the New Order according to Khamami Zada 
was characterized by two specific characteristics, the structure, and 
culture.  
The first is characterized by the rise of the establishment of Islamic 
parties. Among the parties are the Crescent Star Party/Partai Bulan 
Bintang (PBB), the Justice Party/Partai keadilan (PK), the Ummah 
Awakening Party/Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU), the Nahdatul 
Ummah Party/Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU), the Islam Community 
Party/Partai Umat Islam (PUI), the Neo Masyumi/Masyumi Baru, the 
Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 1905, the Masyumi Islamic 
Political Party/Masyumi, and the United Partai/Partai Persatuan (PP). 
Previously, the united Development Party/Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(PPP) existed firstly in the New Order era.  
The second type is characterized by the proliferation of a number 
of Islamic mass organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders 
Front/Front Pembela Islam (FPI), the Laskar Jihad, the Mujahidin 
Council of Indonesia/Majelis Muslim Indonesia (MMI), and Liberation 
Party/Hizb at-Tahrir (HT), Ikhwanul Muslimin, and Majelis Mujahidin 
and others. The movements established in the New Order era, such as 
the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Islamic World/ 
Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI) and the 
Indonesian Muslim Workers Union/Persatuan Pekerja Muslin Indonesia 
(PPMI). The Islamic movement (mass organizations) is characterised 
by its formalistic, militant, and radical characters.16 
 
Prosperous Justice Party and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: A 
Comparative Perspective  
Since the reform era, amounts of Islamic organizations that are 
oriented to the implementation of Islamic teachings emerge. The 
organizations differ in shape and pattern of the movement, such as 
political parties and community organizations. The emergence of 
revivalist da‘wa movement in Indonesia in mid-1998 based on several 
things as follows:  
First, the ideas of Islam that have been buried get the opportunity 
to be presented more freely because the reform era government is 
                                                                
16 Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal (Jakarta: Teraju, (2002). 
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more tolerant toward the Moslem aspirations. Second, the reformation 
as a transitional period give a chance for Islamic activist to promote 
their Islamic values into the government and state system. Third, the 
moral crisis occurred among the leaders and the society as well as the 
secularization in all areas and the economic crisis that caused abnormal 
condition.  
In line with this, the existence of Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 
and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in the political arena of Indonesia is 
a blessing of reform era. Both organizations are the representation of 
two major Indonesian Islamic groups who want to implement Islamic 
sharia and to hold Islamic government.  
PKS, born from tarbiyah movement mostly done on campuses, 
schools and offices, chose to promote the implementation Islamic 
values and sharia through political parties. PKS chose the way by 
defining that Islam is syumul (perfect system), namely thawa>bit and 
mutaghayyira >t. Thawa>bit is the standard of thing that should not change 
for any reason whenever and wherever. It is the binding of wala 
(loyalty), love, and defense. It also a demarcation boundary between 
faith and kufr. Whereas mutaghayyira>t is changeable matters that based 
on ijtihad as it is not explained by the Qur'an or Sunnah explicitly. PKS 
stipulates that the application of Islamic shariah is thawa>bit, while the 
steps of its realization is mutaghayyira>t.17  
According to Tate Qamaruddin, PKS established in 1998 that 
initially named PK then changed to PKS in 2000.18 As a da‘wa chain, 
PKS seeks to apply sharia in all levels of life, including private life, 
family life, organizational life, social life, and political life. Therefore, 
PKS believes that the practice of Islam is inseparable from political 
life. 19 
                                                                
17 Kamarudin, Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi: Refleksi Pemilu 1999 untuk Pemilu 
2004 (Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 2003). 
18 See, Yon Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia: the Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS) (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008); Arief Munandar, “Antara Jemaah 
Dan Partai Politik: Dinamika Habitus Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) dalam 
Arena Politik Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2004” (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, 
Universitas Indonesia – Jakarta, 2011). 
19 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da’wah Mobilization 
among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia”, Journal of Indonesian 
Islam 6, 1 (2012): pp. 17-47. 
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While HTI that emerged in Indonesia in 1984 struggles to enforce 
Islamic sharia within a state of the Caliphate. According to HTI 
activists the struggle in order to uphold the khila>fah state required by 
Allah Swt., in the Qur'an (Ali Imran 3:104) through the establishment 
of a political party.20 In carrying out the mission HTI rejects various 
methods of applying the sharia which he deems erroneous i.e. tadarruj 
(gradually), fighting rulers, fatalism who assume that one day the 
khila>fah will return, and individualism. The correct method is the 
method executed by rasu>lulla>h Saw., namely establishing an Islamic 
State. The first stage is to build cadres. Second, interact with people. 
Third, gain power.21 
In addition, HTI activists are convinced that Muslim not allowed 
(h}ara>m) to adopt, apply, and disseminate any methods including 
socialism, communism and democracy. Therefore, they refuse to 
engage and participate in the government that uses the democratic 
system because according to the leader of HTI,22 democracy has 
brought humans mired in degrees of dirty animals in the sense of 
freedom of conduct. Additionally, democracy has evidently created 
various crises, calamities, and exploitation of the colonized and 
underdeveloped people.23  
Table 3. PKS-HTI Responses to Democracy  
Organization Response to Democracy 
PKS Democracy is a social place to choose someone to lead 
people affairs. They are able to dismiss him if they 
misbehave, nor should they be brought to an economic, 
social, cultural or political system that they do not know and 
dislike. Anyone who wants to contemplate the essence of 
democracy will surely find similarity with the Islamic 
                                                                
20 Syabab Hizb at-Tahrir, Bagaimana Membangun Kembali Khilafah (Bogor: Pustaka 
Thariqul Izzah, 2004). Also see, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “The Quest for Hizbut Tahrir 
in Indonesia”, Asian Journal of Social Science 37 (2009): pp. 623–645 
21 Ibid. See also Masdar Hilmy, “Manufacturing the ‘Ontological Enemy’: Socio-
Political Construction of anti-Democracy Discourses among HTI Activists in Post-
New Order Indonesia”, Journal of Indonesian Islam 3, 2 (2009), pp. 341-369. 
22 Abdul Qadim Zallum, Demokrasi Sistem Kufur Haram Mengambil, Menerapkan dan 
Menyebarluaskannya (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2003). 
23 See also, Ali Maksum, “Discourses on Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: A Study 
on the Intellectual Debate between Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia (HTI) ”, Journal of Indonesian Islam 11, 2 (2017), pp. 405-422. 
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Organization Response to Democracy 
principle, except for the democratic qualities that are 
incompatible with Islam, namely: 1. Popular democracy in 
the West the is definition of nation or ummah bounded by 
region, climate, blood, ethnicity, language and crystallized 
customs. 2. The goals of modern western democracy or the 
democracy that exists in every age are worldly and material 
objectives. 3. The sovereignty of the people according to 
western democracy is a people's absoluteness as the 
supreme power holder regardless of ignorance, tyranny, or 
immorality. 
HTI A democracy actually is kufr system. Democracy is at odds 
with Islamic laws, both globally and in particular. 
Democracy was born from European leaders who claimed 
that a ruler was God's representative on the earth and 
entitled to govern the people according to his power. They 
assume that God has given them the absolute authority to 
rule the people by their own rules, for their power rests on 
God-sourced power, not from the people. As a result they 
freely oppressed and controlled the people as well as 
slavery, then the conflict arose between the European rulers 
and their people, who awakened the philosophers and 
thinkers to develop the concept of the people's government 
system, the democratic system. 
 
Accommodationist and Confrontationist Perspective  
Some characteristics of thought and strategy conducted by HTI 
and PKS as mentioned above considered as the part of revivalists’ 
movement, that is who want to arouse Islamic legal (sharia) as the 
platform statehood and nationality. Nevertheless, both Islamic 
organizations have different ways; PKS tends to be accommodationist 
revivalists, whereas HTI is likely to be confrontationists revivalists.  
The accommodationists believe that any values or doctrines, which 
exist within society should not be rejected as long as it is not at odds 
with Islamic teachings. While Confrontationist revivalists argue that 
any system not derived from Islam assumed as the cause of all forms 
of crisis, especially the moral and political turmoil, and causes Muslims 
away from the implementation of Islamic teachings.  
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Table 4. New Models of Islamic Movement 
Organization Islamic 
Understanding 
Type of 
Movement 
Nature of 
Movement 
PKS Islam is a perfect 
teaching that covers 
things that are thawa >bit 
and mutaghayyira >t.  
Revivalist Accommodationist 
HTI Islam is perfect 
teaching that has 
governed all the affairs 
as well as the way how 
to realise it. 
Revivalist Confrontationist 
 
Besides, they also differ in the way to conceptualize the relation 
between Islam and state. According to PKS, Islam does not 
standardize the concept of the state, but it only gives basic principles. 
Nevertheless, Islam and politics cannot be separated because Islam 
covers political affairs and the statehood. (see table 5).  
 
Table 5. Relations between Islam and the State According to PKS-HTI 
Organization Islam and Politics Relations Realization 
PKS Islam does not standardize the concept of 
the state, but it only gives basic principles. 
Nevertheless, between Islam and politics 
cannot be separated because Islam covers 
political affairs and the statehood. 
Cooperatif 
HTI Islam is a perfect teaching. Therefore, Islam 
organizes all issues in life, including political 
and state issues 
Non 
Cooperatif 
 
Table 6. Actualization of State Concept According to PKS-HTI 
Organization Actualization Stages  Tactical Steps 
PKS To reinforce the spiritual 
value  
To make total and radical 
changes regarding various 
fundamental aspects of 
life.  
To maintain the potential 
of the good society 
To introduce Islamic thought 
to the community as follows: 
Explaining the right to 
freedom of thought  
Presenting in detail the nature 
of jama >‘ah  
Revitalization of the role of 
‘ulama >’ in politics.  
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Organization Actualization Stages  Tactical Steps 
Placing politics as controlling 
activities.  
To establish and choose  
Effective institutions as the 
medium of struggle.  
To engage parliament and to 
mobilize mass  
HTI Developing cadres  
Interacting with the ummah 
to gain support  
Gaining power without 
violence.  
Fostering individuals through 
h }alaqah.  
Conveying Islamic thoughts 
to ummah through public 
lectures and discussions.  
Fighting the ideology, rules, 
and opinion which are rooted 
from kufr.  
Doing political struggle to 
oppose pagan countries by 
exposing their evil.  
Serving people following the 
Islamic sharia 
 
Table 7. Bureaucracy Problems and Solutions 
PKS HTI 
Problems:  
Destruction in all sectors.  
Be a nest of KKN (corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism).  
Not professional in running the 
wheels of government.  
 
Solutions:  
Enter into the bureaucracy and 
occupy a strategic position with 
morals kari >mah (noble).  
Establish an independent forum for 
government employees.  
Combating Corruption, upholding 
Problems:  
The state becomes capitalist.  
The position of the state as producer 
and the people as consumers.  
Corruption is everywhere.  
 
Solutions:  
Every parish must be involved in 
politics and must be a statesman. 
Statesman is a person who thinks 
about the interests of the ummah is 
not selfish or his group, although he is 
a laborer, ordinary employee or 
farmer.  
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PKS HTI 
honesty, fairness, simplicity and 
professional in serving the 
community.  
Controls actively.  
 
Fighting the fate and welfare of the 
people according to the guidance of 
Islamic sharia .  
take over the leadership of the people 
by forming influential groups or 
powers so as to be able to oppose the 
government and ultimately seize 
control of the government. 
  
In short, PKS and HTI have different ways in transforming those 
ideas. First, in terms of politics, they differ fundamentally in 
conceptualizing Islamic state, namely PKS develops the conception of 
state within the national territorial sphere, whereas HTI stands up for a 
world state. Second, in regards to the realization of the idea, the PKS is 
more accommodative with democracy system, while HTI is more 
opposed to the existence of democracy. Third, concerning on the 
strategy of implementation of sharia, PKS represent a structural, 
activism, movement, and accommodative, whereas HTI uses cultural, 
thought, and confrontational movement. 
 
Conclusion  
This study succeeded in explaining several things related to the 
pattern of the post-reform era revivalist Islamic movement. The 
scholars’ viewpoint regarding the categories of traditionalist and 
modernist Muslims seems to do not entirely appropriate to analyze the 
phenomenon of the Islamic movement lately. It can be seen that the 
PKS and HTI movement shows that they are likely to be a “melting 
pot” between traditionalists and modernists. Likewise with the 
formalist and essentialist category. Indeed, PKS and HTI’s movement 
pattern is more associated with accommodationist and confrontational 
revivalist Muslim. 
Furthermore, the involvement of revivalists in politics lately 
seemed to increase, and it confirms that the notion of view that 
between Islam and politics and the state cannot be separated.[] 
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